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Abstract: After the end of communism enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were
marked by low levels of labor productivity, mainly because of too high employment levels.
According to economic theory, the corporate capital structure can be an important element in
the restructuring process. But both, empirical evidence on corporate finance in CEE countries
and its relation to employment is still sparse. This study describes the patterns of the corporate
capital structure for ten CEE countries over the years 1993-1998, taking two major Western
economies as a benchmark. An impressive rise in total indebtedness suggests that there is
room for creditors to fulfill their role in corporate governance. On the other hand, investment
is predominantly financed internally in CEE firms, making creditor and shareholder govern-
ance more difficult. But a regression analysis shows that inefficient CEE firms are forced to
downsize employment when they finance themselves largely externally, but less so for those
firms with high levels of debt. However, downsizing is limited by soft budget constraints.
Key Words: Central and Eastern Europe; corporate finance; industry restructuring
JEL Classification: G 31, G 34, O 12Non-Technical Summary
After the end of communism enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were marked
by low levels of labor productivity and low levels of debt. At the same time, the financial
sector did not function as an intermediary of financial resources as in developed Western
economies. Also, it did not fulfill its control function over debtors’ activities. The central
question of this study is whether the corporate capital structure works as a disciplining device
in CEE enterprises, or more specifically, whether creditors can fulfill their corporate govern-
ance function by forcing inefficient firms to downsize.
Based on firm-level data for the period 1993-1998, we find the following patterns of corporate
finance for CEE companies:
•   Indebtedness of CEE enterprises has increased rapidly during transition, although the total
level of debt is still lower than in Western firms; the dominance of short-term debt has
weakened only slightly during transition; coverage of current liabilities has declined, indi-
cating shrinking liquidity of CEE firms.
•   Labor productivity is much lower than in Western enterprises, indicating low efficiency;
funding from current income reaches or exceeds Western levels, probably due to still less
intensive competition in CEE product markets; during transition, productivity as well as
reserves have increased rapidly, and growth of sales and current income have decreased.
•   CEE firms finance themselves predominantly internally, and external finance by debt is
much more important than external finance by equity; during transition, internal finance
has become much more important in all CEE countries with the exception of Poland; the
likelihood of soft budget constraints has increased, and is the largest in Romania and the
Czech Republic during 1996-1998.
•   Slovenia, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are the most advanced economies in
terms of efficient usage of resources; Estonia, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Repub-
lic show the highest levels of debt.
Taken together, these descriptive results suggest that there is room for corporate governance
exercised by creditors: CEE enterprises are already highly indebted after only ten years of
transition, and their liquidity is shrinking, possibly indicating hardening budget constraints. At
the same time, CEE enterprises finance themselves largely internally, even more so during
later transition, making corporate governance action from creditors, but also from sharehold-
ers more difficult.In a more formal analysis we examine the effect of financial pressure on downsizing under
ceteris paribus conditions. We find that firms with a larger burden of debt do not downsize
significantly more, but that firms, which finance themselves largely by debt, show signifi-
cantly larger downsizing activity. This effect is stronger, the lower the total burden of debt is.
This suggests that financial intermediaries are already able to fulfill their monitoring function
by pressing CEE firms to downsize, but only when these firms are dependent on bank finance.
Likewise, firms which show larger inflows of capital from equity issues show larger
downsizing activity – an indicator of corporate governance action by shareholders.
Downsizing seems to hit the ‘right’ firms as inefficient firms reduce their labor force signifi-
cantly more. Finally, firms which are likely to have soft budget constraints reduce employ-
ment significantly less. There is evidence that this kind of governmental support limits re-
structuring especially in Bulgaria and Romania.1
1 Introduction
After the end of communism CEE enterprises were marked by low levels of labor productiv-
ity and low levels of debt. At the same time, the financial sector did not function as an inter-
mediary of financial resources as in developed Western economies. Also, it did not fulfill its
control function over debtors’ activities. The central question of this study is whether the cor-
porate capital structure works as a disciplining device in CEE enterprises, or more specifi-
cally, whether creditors can fulfill their corporate governance function by forcing inefficient
firms to downsize.
To tackle this question we make use of a data set which is unique in three perspectives: In
contrast to previous studies we do not exclusively analyze listed firms. Second, our medium-
and large-sized firms are taken from a broad set of industries, including manufacturing, min-
ing, trade and non-financial services. Third, besides broad geographical coverage we have
data on a long period of transition, at the maximum for the years 1993-1998.
Section 2 starts with a brief review of previous evidence on patterns of corporate finance in
CEE economies, and a short discussion of the role of corporate finance as a corporate govern-
ance device. Section 3 describes our data set. In section 4, we compare the patterns of corpo-
rate finance in CEE enterprises with those in Western enterprises, taking Germany and the
United Kingdom as a benchmark, and look for cross-country heterogeneity within Central and
Eastern Europe. This descriptive analysis serves to indicate how financial pressure has
evolved during transition, and in which countries it is likely to be the largest. Section 5 con-
tains a more formal analysis of the effect of the corporate capital structure on downsizing ac-
tivity. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review and Hypotheses
We start with a brief overview of previous descriptive evidence on corporate finance in CEE
countries (2.1). Then we shortly review the theoretical literature on the corporate capital
structure as a corporate governance device (2.2).
2.1 Corporate Finance in CEE Countries: Previous Evidence
In the planned economy, investment was financed through funds allocated through the plan.
Thus, existing CEE companies started out without any debt to financial institutions, and most
investment is still internally financed (BEVAN et al. 1999, GROS AND STEINHERR 1995).2
Regular evidence on recent developments of corporate finance in CEE enterprises can be
found in the annual reports of the European Bank for Recovery and Development (EBRD).
Generally, the EBRD reports are regionally broad as they include all CEE countries as well as
all former Soviet Republics. Based on survey results, EBRD (1999) reports that CEE compa-
nies fund gross fixed investment primarily from internal sources. External funding plays a
much smaller role: Bank loans account for an average of 12 percent and sales of stock for 11
percent of gross fixed investment. In the countries of South Eastern Europe these figures are
much lower with eight and one percent, respectively. In the survey, business managers cite
“the lack of access to finance as the single most important obstacle to the operation and
growth of their business” (EBRD 1999: 137).
1
Since CEE capital markets are still underdeveloped (EBRD 1999, LANNOO and SALEM 2000)
and mainly function as a vehicle for privatization (KÖKE et al. 2000), the role of bank finance
becomes crucial. EBRD (1999) confirms that it is mainly the privatized, but also new private
firms that can raise equity through initial or second public offerings on the stock market. In
turn, “government firms tend to have favored access to [cheaper] government credits” (EBRD
1999: 137). Tax arrears seem to be the most likely for Slovenia, the Czech and the Slovak
Republic. However, pressure from creditors and the government seems to affect the likelihood
for organizational change (EBRD 1999: 141). Whereas the EBRD study offers broad country
coverage it steps short of providing detailed information on core measures of corporate fi-
nance, e.g. the debt margin or the interest burden. In addition, due to the method of data col-
lection (survey) the country-specific sample sizes are rather small.
HUSSAIN and NIVOROZHKIN (1997) and CSERMELY and VINCZE (1999) solve the first problem
by providing detailed evidence on the corporate capital structure of Polish and Hungarian
firms, respectively. For Poland, HUSSAIN and NIVOROZHKIN (1997) report an average debt
margin of 32 percent, which is very low compared with an average of 66 percent documented
for Western enterprises (RAJAN and ZINGALES 1995). They interpret this as evidence of banks’
unwillingness to grant new loans to old and risky firms that have accumulated bad debt in the
communist era. Larger and newer firms have higher levels of leverage, probably indicating
                                                
1 The existing evidence on financial constraints in CEE economies is mixed, and only relates to investment in
assets. Using survey data on small- and medium-sized enterprises from the three most advanced transition
countries BRATKOWSKI et al. (1999) find that the only real constraint for investment is a lack of collateral.
JOHNSON et al. (1999), using survey data on firms in Poland, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic and the
Ukraine, confirm that collateral is an important determinant of loans. But they find that credit is less important
than retained earnings for investment. The willingness to reinvest profits does not depend on access to credits,
but on the perceived security of property rights.3
their better reputation and hence a higher willingness of banks to lend. For Hungary,
CSERMELY and VINCZE (1999) report similarly low levels of debt, but find a high importance
of equity finance. They attribute this to privatization, but also limited access to bank loans.
CORNELLI et al. (1996) confirm an average debt level of 30 to 40 percent in Hungary and Po-
land using samples of 2700 and 40000 firms, respectively. All three studies contain detailed
measures of corporate finance. However, the first two exclusively analyze listed firms. And
all three studies are of limited use for comparison with other CEE or Western economies be-
cause balance sheet items are not treated consistently.
KÖKE et al. (2000) address this lack of comparative evidence. They analyze the corporate
capital structure in detail for five EU accession countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Po-
land, Estonia and Slovenia. The result of previous studies concerning low levels of debt is
confirmed: 35 percent in Poland and 29 percent in Hungary. In Slovenia it is even lower with
only 19 percent. In addition, by analyzing flow of funds data KÖKE et al. (2000) can confirm
these results which have been calculated from balance sheet data. Although KÖKE  et al.
(2000) provide comparative evidence for several CEE countries, the study is limited by its
focus on listed firms. Besides, differing accounting rules make it difficult to compare the re-
sults directly with Western economies.
2.2 The Corporate Capital Structure as a Disciplining Device
The literature on corporate governance discusses various mechanisms how management can
be induced to maximize shareholder value (SHLEIFER and VISHNY 1997). One of these mecha-
nisms is the corporate capital structure.
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ROSS (1977) argues that management is better informed about the firm’s future profitability
than providers of external capital. But managers can use the capital structure to signal credit-
worthiness to investors. When managers know that they are better able than their competitors
to adjust to demand shocks and hence to avoid bankruptcy, ceteris paribus, their firms can
stand a higher debt burden. ZWIEBEL (1996) extends this argument to agency costs, the classi-
cal problem of corporate governance: Managers can commit themselves to invest funds from
external investors efficiently by increasing firm leverage. In this sense, an increase in leverage
at the expense of free cash flow (JENSEN 1986) signals creditworthiness to outside investors
because managers are forced to pay out all cash flow which cannot be invested in profitable4
investment projects inside the firm.
3 Likewise, high interest payments can put firms under
significant pressure from the creditors’ side.
4 Hence, we hypothesize that financial pressure
should support restructuring towards cost-efficient production, e.g. through layoffs. This fi-
nancial pressure should be higher, the more dependent a firm is on external finance, e.g. due
to low internally generated funds.
The empirical literature on transition economies has shown that downsizing of capital and
labor is associated with the stage of enterprise restructuring preceding investment. It mainly
concerns firms that have been suffering from production inefficiencies, or that have lost the
markets they used to produce for before the start of transition (FAGGIO and KONINGS 1999,
REPKIN and WALSH 1999). We therefore hypothesize that in particular inefficient firms, or
those which can draw only on small current or retained income, are forced to restructure and
hence to downsize their labor force. However, defeating inefficiencies through initial labor-
shedding also depends on firms’ access to alternative sources of finance, most notably direct
subsidies from the government or tax arrears (EBRD 1999). Hence, we hypothesize that de-
creases in employment are less likely for firms which have access to governmental support.
Besides creditors, shareholders play a crucial role in corporate governance.
5 But information
asymmetries and coordination costs among shareholders can reduce shareholders’ incentives
to monitor management. However, shareholders’ incentive to screen a firm thoroughly should
be particularly large, when (new or old) shareholders are requested to invest fresh capital, e.g.
to finance new labor-substituting machinery. Hence, we hypothesize that an inflow of equity
capital (as an indicator of corporate governance action) will have a positive effect on
downsizing, in particular for inefficient firms.
6
In sum, we hypothesize that firms will downscale employment, if they face a strong need to
downsize, reflected in low productivity and low profitability, and if external pressure is large,
reflected in a strong position of creditors and a high dependency on external funds.
                                                                                                                                                      
2 For a review of the existing literature on gross job flows in transition economies see DAVIS and HALTIWANGER
(1999). There are analyses on the relation of changes in the level of employment and ownership types of firms,
but not on the relation to the corporate capital structure.
3 On the other hand, growing leverage might increase the risk of bankruptcy too much. Then firms might be
unable to obtain further external funds (MYERS 1977). In this case, firms with a high debt burden might have to
forego good investment opportunities.
4 NICKELL and NICOLITSAS (1999) show for British firms that high financial pressure has a large negative impact
on employment and a small positive impact on productivity growth.
5 See again SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1997) and SHORT (1994) for a review of the literature.
6 As explained in section 4, we use increases in the book value of share capital as an indicator of corporate gov-
ernance action.5
3 Data
The data source we use to construct our basic sample is AMADEUS, purchased by LICOS from
Bureau van Dijk/Belgium. Our data set is unique in at least three perspectives. First, we do
not exclusively analyze firms which are listed on the stock exchange. Our data set consists of
medium- and mostly non-listed large-sized firms.
7 The median firm has about 250 employees
(Table 1). Since stock market capitalization in all CEE countries is still low compared with
developed Western stock markets, we want to shift the focus slightly to these medium-sized
and non-listed firms.
Table 1: Firm Size by Sales and Number of Employees
Sales (in US$) Number of Employees
total in percent total in percent
<1,000,000 8094 16.7 <100 4563 9.0
<2,000,000 13903 28.7 <250 24815 49.4
<5,000,000 24308 50.1 <500 37091 73.8
<10,000,000 32768 67.5 <750 41889 83.4
<20,000,000 40142 82.7 <1000 44270 88.1
<50,000,000 45401 93.6 <2000 48034 95.6
>=50,000,000 3117 6.4 >=2000 2198 4.4
Total 48518 100 Total 50232 100
Second, in order to make our conclusions as representative as possible we include a broad
range of industries: the manufacturing sector, the coal and mining industry, the trade sector,
and industries providing non-financial services. We exclude the agricultural sector, industries
providing financial services and all governmental agencies.
8
Third, all ten CEE countries are covered with which the EU started negotiations on EU acces-
sion.
9 In addition, we include two major Western economies as a benchmark to assess the
state of transition of the CEE countries.
10 By calculating the same measures for this broad
range of countries we ease cross-country comparison. Finally, we use panel data instead of
cross-section data: We cover the years 1993-1998, hence a large part of the transition period.
                                                
7 AMADEUS comprises company accounts data for all firms whose number of employees exceeds 100, or where
total assets and sales exceed 12 ml. US$. Either, not both of these conditions must be met.
8 Although in particular the agricultural sector is still very important in terms of employees in most CEE econo-
mies, we prefer to exclude it from the analysis since the disclosure requirements for agricultural enterprises are
rather complicated and much different from other industries.
9 These are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia and the
Slovak Republic.
10 These are Germany and the United Kingdom.6
In total, we have over 48,000 observations on CEE enterprises and over 60,000 on Western
enterprises.
11 These are used to calculate the descriptive statistics shown in section 4. The
regression in section 5 is run on a subset of this sample. Since our endogenous variable is cal-
culated as a growth rate and since we use lagged values for the exogenous variables, sample
size is reduced significantly. The basic regression model is run on 9033 observations.
All data are taken from corporate annual accounts and are denominated in US dollars. As far
as the exchange rate does not fully adjust to inflation, in particular during times of hyperinfla-
tion, these dollar values might be biased. To cope with this problem all financial variables in
this study are used in ratios only. Therefore we do not deflate our data. To cope with potential
estimation bias caused by outliers we truncate all variables, taking the 1 percentile and 99
percentile as cut-off points. Finally, besides financial variables we also have information on
employment, but we lack information on ownership structures.
4 Descriptive Evidence
Before analyzing formally whether the corporate capital structure already performs a disci-
plining function in CEE enterprises (section 5) we roughly sketch the patterns of corporate
finance in the CEE economies. We compare them with the patterns that we find for our West-
ern benchmark countries, and we look for cross-country heterogeneity within Central and
Eastern Europe.
4.1 Potential for Internal Finance
To assess the potential for internal finance we use several measures: return-on-sales and the
growth rate of sales as measures of current income, the ratio of retained earnings to assets as
a measure of funding from past income, and labor productivity as a measure of efficiency
indicating how internal funds are ‘generated’ by cost-efficient production (Tables 2 and 3).
12
                                                
11 See Table A.1 in the appendix for the number of observations by country and period covered (1993-1995 vs.
1996-1998).
12 For definitions of all variables used in this study see Table A.2 in the appendix.7
Table 2: Potential for Internal Finance (1996-1998)
in percent Return-on-Sales Growth Rate of Sales Retained Earnings Labor Productivity
Bulgaria 3.6 (4.8) -13.5 (39.9) 19.7 (25.3) 3.0 (13.9)
Czech Republic 2.9 (2.3) -0.3 (18.4) 6.1 (8.8) 32.1 (115.3)
Estonia 2.7 (2.3) 10.1 (37.4) 18.3 (20.5) 22.9 (117.6)
Hungary 2.9 (3.4) 1.8 (19.5) 10.9 (13.0) 33.1 (99.2)
Lithuania 3.0 (0.7) 16.1 (36.7) 12.1 (16.6) 15.4 (39.1)
Latvia 2.2 (0.3) 17.3 (57.1) 8.4 (8.6) 14.5 (57.4)
Poland 4.0 (4.7) 1.0 (9.3) 26.4 (27.8) 32.7 (102.1)
Romania 6.9 (7.5) -2.8 (15.2) 7.5 (10.6) 5.9 (11.0)
Slovenia 3.9 (1.4) -7.9 (7.1) n.a. 43.9 (81.7)
Slovak Republic 2.6 (1.5) 3.2 (28.0) 7.2 (8.2) 24.1 (69.4)
Total 4.1 (4.6) -0.1 (21.1) 10.1 (15.5) 16.7 (65.9)
United Kingdom 3.7 (5.8) n.a. 19.1 (19.4) 208.1 (534.0)
Germany 3.2 (3.9) n.a. 13.5 (17.1) 279.0 (1249.2)
Notes: Median of variable (mean in parentheses). For definitions of variables see Table A.2 in the appendix.
First, we find a large discrepancy between CEE and Western enterprises on the measures of
retained earnings and labor productivity (Table 2). The median level of retained earnings in
the UK (19.1 percent) is almost twice as high as the median level in the CEE countries (10.1
percent). Likewise, labor productivity in both Germany and the UK is more than ten times the
CEE labor productivity. Thus there is still a very large gap between CEE and Western enter-
prises concerning efficiency and the potential to finance investment from past income. This
gap is much smaller or non-existent for current income, depending on the CEE country we
look at.
Second, we find significant heterogeneity among the CEE economies. Looking at return-on-
sales, the potential for internal funding from current income is high in Romania, Poland and
Slovenia. Profitability is lower in Estonia and Hungary. Regarding the growth rate of sales,
especially the Baltic States have a sound potential for internal funding when rapidly increas-
ing sales reflect large profit margins in the product markets. Comparing the figures on labor
productivity across the ten CEE countries we find that Slovenia, Hungary, Poland and the
Czech Republic are the most advanced, but Bulgaria and Romania are far behind in terms of
efficient usage of resources. The potential for internal funding from past income is by far the
highest in Polish companies, the lowest in Czech and Slovak enterprises.8
Table 3: Potential for Internal Finance (1993-1995)
in percent Return-on-Sales Growth Rate of Sales Retained Earnings Labor Productivity
Bulgaria 1.9 (0.7) 8.8 (16.1) 0.3 (0.0) 5.5 (11.88)
Czech Republic 4.0 (3.8) 18.9 (42.1) 7.7 (10.9) 26.9 (96.78)
Estonia 4.0 (4.0) 22.6 (59.1) 25.2 (26.9) 14.1 (73.9)
Hungary 2.5 (1.5) 9.9 (51.3) 7.9 (10.8) 30.7 (115.1)
Lithuania 6.2 (4.5) 11.9 (11.9) 20.0 (24.2) 14.3 (15.2)
Latvia 3.4 (2.9) 24.1 (73.8) 7.5 (12.3) 32.3 (11.1)
Poland 5.1 (5.7) 31.2 (49.3) 26.6 (29.0) 30.7 (92.3)
Romania 7.0 (8.0) -0.6 (25.0) 4.5 89.7) 5.5 (11.5)
Slovenia n.a. 15.2 (32.5) n.a. 41.8 (72.7)
Slovak Republic 3.5 (2.6) 18.1 (57.7) 8.5 (10.5) 18.9 (61.7)
Total 4.5 (4.5) 13.1 (32.3) 5.7 (9.8) 13.0 (50.2)
Notes: Median of variable (mean in parentheses). For definitions of variables see Table A.2 in the appendix.
Third, a comparison between the two periods 1993-1995 and 1996-1998 reveals some inter-
esting developments over time (Table 3). In the median, the potential for internal funding
from current income has declined when we look at return-on-sales and sales growth. In the
mean, however, the opposite is the case, indicating increasing margins for few companies. In
contrast, efficiency and retained earnings have improved strongly. If firms finance investment
in capital or labor from retained income or ‘saved’ resources (by means of efficient produc-
tion), then this is evidence that the potential for internal funding has grown during transition.
The largest decrease in returns-on-sales takes place in Poland, the Czech and the Slovak Re-
public; the largest improvement in labor productivity can be found in Estonia, the largest in-
crease in reserves in Bulgaria and Hungary.
4.2 Structure of External Finance
To assess the structure of external finance we use the following measures: the debt margin as
a measure of the total burden of debt, the short-term ratio as a measure of the maturity of
debt, the borrowing ratio as a measure of the corporate interest burden, and the current ratio
as a measure of corporate liquidity (Tables 4 and 5).
13
                                                
13 For definitions of all variables used in this study see Table A.2 in the appendix.9
Table 4: Structure of External Finance (1996-1998)
in percent Debt Margin Short-Term Ratio Borrowing Ratio Current Ratio
Bulgaria 44.8 (49.8) 100.0 (90.9) 3.9 (19.1) 117.1 (153.9)
Czech Republic 57.4 (58.2) 80.3 (73.9) 44.7 (45.5) 123.4 (173.5)
Estonia 60.9 (60.4) 85.9 (78.9) 13.6 (19.6) 112.1 (147.7)
Hungary 46.8 (49.5) 86.0 (79.1) n.a. 138.1 (180.0)
Lithuania 41.6 (44.2) 97.3 (82.8) n.a. 144.3 (220.8)
Latvia 57.2 (57.0) 100.0 (83.2) n.a. 124.9 (197.6)
Poland 48.8 (50.4) 96.2 (85.5) 2.8 (12.4) 132.7 (173.8)
Romania 41.2 (44.3) 99.9 (89.6) 15.5 (25.9) 123.0 (149.9)
Slovenia 45.2 (49.9) 89.3 (82.2) n.a. 111.6 (153.0)
Slovak Republic 53.5 (57.0) 82.4 (74.2) 31.7 (32.5) 120.6 (161.7)
Total 48.3 (50.9) 95.5 (83.8) 24.9 (30.9) 124.3 (164.9)
United Kingdom 70.3 (65.9) 93.2 (81.4) 10.2 (16.6) 117.9 (223.5)
Germany 72.7 (69.6) 57.2 (56.8) 13.2 (19.7) 132.6 (240.9)
Notes: Median of variable (mean in parentheses). For definitions of variables see Table A.2 in the appendix.
First, previous evidence that CEE enterprises are less indebted than Western firms is strongly
supported by the present data (Table 4). A median debt margin of 48.3 percent in the CEE
economies contrasts with 70.3 percent in the UK and 72.7 percent in Germany. However,
indebtedness of CEE firms is large, considering that the burden of debt was accumulated only
within a few years of transition. Differences emerge also in the maturity structure of debt:
German enterprises have much less short-term debt (57.2 percent) than CEE enterprises where
almost all debt is short-term (95.5 percent). On the other hand, British firms also show a high
fraction of short-term debt similar to CEE companies.
14 Looking at the interest burden we find
that the borrowing ratio is much higher in the Czech and the Slovak Republic.
Second, there are again significant discrepancies between the CEE economies. The burden of
debt is highest in Estonia (60.9 percent), the Czech Republic (57.4 percent) and Latvia (57.2
percent). It is the lowest in Romania (41.2 percent) and Lithuania (41.6 percent). The highest
fraction of short-term debt can be found in Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania where almost no
long-term debt exists.
                                                
14 This difference between Germany and the UK might be explained with fundamental differences how capital is
provided: Germany is often referred to as a bank-based system with long-term relationships between creditors
and borrowers, but the UK as a market-based system in which firms primarily finance themselves in the capital
markets (MAYER 1988, EDWARDS and FISCHER 1994).10
Table 5: Structure of External Finance (1993-1995)
in percent Debt Margin Short-Term Ratio Borrowing Ratio Current Ratio
Bulgaria 32.5 (39.1) 100.0 (88.7) 20.0 (26.7) 127.7 (184.7)
Czech Republic 47.7 (52.3) 79.0 (73.1) 40.1 (40.9) 145.2 (203.1)
Estonia 49.5 (50.0) 91.4 (79.9) 9.7 (20.3) 144.4 (192.6)
Hungary 41.7 (46.4) 83.9 (77.3) n.a. 145.6 (196.8)
Lithuania 36.4 (40.8) 100.0 (86.8) n.a. 149.3 (227.1)
Latvia 45.1 (48.7) 100.0 (88.5) n.a. 143.9 (206.8)
Poland 49.4 (52.0) 89.0 (79.3) 8.5 (17.3) 142.0 (185.3)
Romania 23.3 (30.2) 100.0 (91.6) 21.9 (30.6) 128.5 (158.1)
Slovenia 35.6 (40.3) 90.0 (84.7) n.a. 117.9 (157.6)
Slovak Republic 43.7 (48.9) 86.6 (77.7) 29.7 (35.3) 135.2 (184.1)
Total 36.6 (42.5) 96.7 (83.9) 28.8 (31.8) 133.9 (182.0)
Notes: Median of variable (mean in parentheses). For definitions of variables see Table A.2 in the appendix.
Third, a comparison between the two periods 1993-1995 and 1996-1998 shows that the me-
dian debt margin increased significantly from 36.6 percent to 48.3 percent (Table 5). This
suggests that, in terms of indebtedness, the CEE economies are catching up rapidly to West-
ern levels. No significant improvement, however, can be found concerning the maturity
structure because the fraction of short-term loans decreased only by one percentage point. The
decrease in the borrowing ratio suggests that the effect of decreasing interest rates is stronger
than the effect of more intensive lending activity. In turn, the large decrease in the current
ratio shows that coverage of short-term liabilities has weakened significantly. In sum, reduced
liquidity of CEE companies combined with increasing indebtedness might expose CEE com-
panies to higher pressure from the lenders’ side during later transition.
4.3 Internal versus External Finance
Let us now turn to the relative importance of the different sources of finance. We define total
finance as the sum of gross profits (internal finance), the net increase in debt (external debt
finance) and the net increase in the book value of share capital (external equity finance).
15 The
degree of internal finance and external finance by debt and equity as shown in Tables 6 and 7
is calculated as the fraction of total finance. We also provide information on soft budget con-
straints, calculated as an indicator how likely a particular firm is to receive direct subsidies or
tax arrears.
                                                
15 Note that internal finance does not include depreciation. This is certainly an important element of internal
finance but we choose to neglect it because accounting data are most likely to be biased on this item. Therefore,
the degree of internal finance as reported here is a lower bound. Note that we do not have information on the
actual value of share issues, but just their book value. Equity finance is therefore underestimated.11
Table 6: Internal versus External Finance, Soft Budget Constraints (1996-1998)
in percent Internal Finance Debt Finance Equity Finance Soft Budget Constraints
Bulgaria 62.7 34.8 2.5 0.6
Czech Republic 46.3 42.8 10.9 2.8
Estonia 43.9 44.2 11.9 0.7
Hungary 57.5 35.6 6.9 1.8
Lithuania 43.7 40.9 15.4 0.0
Latvia 47.5 39.7 12.8 0.0
Poland 60.9 32.0 7.1 2.4
Romania 68.0 29.4 2.6 4.6
Slovenia n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.2
Slovak Republic 48.7 46.4 4.9 2.5
Total 58.5 35.3 6.2 2.6
Notes: Mean of variable. The first to third column add up to 100. These variables could not be calculated for
Germany and the United Kingdom because for these countries only data on the year 1997 is available. For
definitions of variables see Table A.2 in the appendix.
First, we find that internal finance is the dominant source of finance in CEE enterprises (Table
6). This is a result, which is also known for Western companies (HELLWIG 1997). During
1996-1998, CEE companies generated about 59 percent of their funds internally. About 35
percent are obtained from increases in debt, and only a small fraction (6.2 percent) stems from
equity issues.
Second, a comparison between the CEE countries reveals significant cross-country heteroge-
neity. Internal finance is the highest in Romania and Bulgaria, but much lower in all three
Baltic states. The degree of debt finance is high in the Slovak Republic, Estonia and the
Czech Republic. At the same time, Estonia and the two other Baltic states were able to fi-
nance a larger portion of their investments through equity finance. On the other hand, equity
finance is very low in Bulgaria and Romania.
Table 7: Internal versus External Finance, Soft Budget Constraints (1993-1995)
in percent Internal Finance Debt Finance Equity Finance Soft Budget Constraints
Bulgaria 50.9 42.1 7.0 0.9
Czech Republic 23.6 44.6 31.8 0.9
Estonia 33.3 45.2 21.5 1.4
Hungary 54.1 36.5 9.4 0.5
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Latvia 34.4 41.4 24.2 0.0
Poland 67.1 27.2 5.7 0.2
Romania 56.7 37.7 5.6 4.5
Slovenia n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.8
Slovak Republic 28.0 37.2 34.8 0.4
Total 43.2 41.1 15.7 1.7
Notes: Mean of variable. The first to third column add up to 100. For definitions of variables see Table A.2 in
the appendix.12
Third, a comparison of the two periods 1993-1995 and 1996-1998 shows that, on average, the
importance of internal finance increased significantly (Table 7). In turn, external finance from
equity and debt is much less important in 1996-1998. The largest increases in internal finance
can be found in the Czech and Slovak Republics as well as in Latvia. As can be seen from
Table 6, these are also the countries that have very high external equity finance during 1993-
1995. Internal finance has therefore increased, to a large extent at the expense of equity fi-
nance, but also debt finance. Poland is an exception in this trend as it is the only country
where equity finance has increased
Finally, we find evidence that the likelihood of soft budget constraints increased from 1993 to
1998. During 1996-1998 about 2.6 percent of the firms were likely to have a soft budget con-
straint, but only 1.7 percent during 1993-1995.
In sum, if we take the degree of debt finance, i.e. the percentage of gross investments which is
financed by debt, as an indicator of financial pressure from creditors on management, then
this pressure appears to have weakened during transition. Likewise, shareholders’ opportuni-
ties to exercise corporate control seem to have been reduced during transition because less
capital has been raised through equity issues during later transition. The only exception is
Poland because financial pressure from creditors as well as from shareholders appears to have
increased, based on larger external finance by debt and equity. However, the likelihood of soft
budget constraints has increased for most CEE economies, in particular also for Poland.
5 The Role of Financial Pressure in Downsizing Activity
The intent of this study is to determine whether the corporate capital structure plays a signifi-
cant role in corporate governance, or more specifically, in forcing inefficient CEE firms to
downsize.
5.1 Summary Statistics
Table 8 displays in how far CEE firms actually increase or decrease employment. For about
15 percent of the firms in the sample we observe a significant annual increase in employment,
and for about 20 percent a significant annual decrease.
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16 By significant we mean an annual increase/decrease in the labor force by ten percent or more.13
Table 8: Percentage of Firms with Increasing/Decreasing Employment (1993-1998)
in percent Increase in employment No significant increase or de-
crease in employment
Decrease in employment
Bulgaria 10.42 67.77 21.81
Czech Republic 6.33 82.39 11.28
Estonia 29.98 46.84 23.19
Hungary 16.10 69.72 14.18
Lithuania 17.50 52.5 30.00
Latvia 36.32 42.13 21.55
Poland 23.21 61.33 15.46
Romania 15.92 53.39 30.70
Slovenia 13.03 69.28 17.69
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Weighted Average 15.07 65.19 19.74
Notes: Increase in employment: positive annual growth rate of employment of ten percent or more. No signifi-
cant increase or decrease in employment: annual growth rate of employment of less than plus ten percent and
more than minus ten percent. Decrease in employment: negative annual growth rate of employment of ten
percent or less.
Restructuring is not distributed evenly over the CEE economies. The largest numbers of firms
with increasing employment are observed for Latvia, Estonia and Poland, and the least for the
Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Slovenia. In turn, significant downsizing takes place in Roma-
nia, Lithuania and Estonia, much less in the Czech Republic. Hence, according to Table 8
restructuring is stagnating the most seriously in the Czech Republic.
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Exogenous Variables
Increase in employment No significant increase or
decrease in employment
Decrease in employment
Debt Margin 0.544** 0.433 0.409**
Current Ratio 1.676** 1.829 1.650**
Borrowing Ratio 0.276** 0.335 0.276**
Short-Term Ratio 0.856** 0.826 0.864**
Return-on-Sales 0.077** 0.046 0.023**
Cash Flow 5.960** 6.221 5.638**
Retained Earnings Ratio 0.148** 0.103 0.053**
Labor Productivity 102.759** 51.669 22.147**
Degree of Debt Finance 0.410** 0.369 0.328
Degree of Internal Finance 0.509** 0.537 0.583**
Soft Budget Constraints 0.005** 0.027 0.032**
Mean Growth Rate of Sales 0.735** 0.212 0.076**
Size 4.920** 5.777 5.946**
Age 9.270** 14.711 14.374
Notes: All variables refer to the period preceding the restructuring activity. * (**) indicates that the means of the
second and the third, the third and the fourth column respectively, are significantly different at the 5%-level
(1%-level) of significance.14
Table 9 shows that firms, which increase their labor force, have significantly higher levels of
debt, better profitability, more reserves, much higher labor productivity and better growth
opportunities than downsizing firms. Also, they rely relatively more on external finance by
debt, less on internal funding. According to the univariate analysis of Table 9, downsizing
does not seem to be fueled by financial pressure from creditors because downsizing firms, on
average, have a lower debt margin, a lower borrowing ratio and even a higher probability of
soft budget constraints than firms which do not downsize. Management in downsizing firms
seems to face less pressure from outside suppliers of capital because a larger share of invest-
ments is financed internally compared with firms that do not downsize. But downsizing firms
have also a much lower potential for internal funding, as reflected by lower returns-on-equity,
lower labor productivity and a smaller cash flow position. In sum, there is no clear evidence
from the univariate analysis that firms downsize following financial pressure from creditors or
investors. To answer this question we next analyze downsizing under ceteris paribus condi-
tions, estimating an empirical model using regression analysis.
5.2 Econometric Considerations
Our key determinant of downsizing, the corporate capital structure, is likely to be endoge-
nous. For example, revenues are likely to increase when a firm enters a new market and costs
are likely to decrease when the labor force is reduced. To cope with potential bias in estimated
coefficients due to this endogeneity problem we employ all variables with a lag of one period.
We recognize that this procedure does not exclude estimation bias. For example, a restructur-
ing program planned for the period ahead might affect lending already in the current period.
Banks might, in this instance, be more willing to extend their credits to that firm. But we
would argue that this effect of reverse causality is less likely for variables like the debt margin
or reserves since these measures change rather in the longer-term.
Second, other firm-specific factors might be important determinants of corporate restructur-
ing. For example, FRYDMAN et al. (1999) show for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
that privatization has different effects on enterprise performance depending on the type of the
owner. Privatization significantly improves labor growth only in foreign-owned and manager-
controlled firms. Thus, the ownership structure is likely to be important; likewise, the creditor
structure might be relevant. Essentially, these are major elements of corporate governance.
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17 See SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1997) for a in-depth review of the mechanisms of corporate governance.15
Unfortunately, we lack this kind of information. But we try to proxy for this by taking
changes in outstanding capital as an indicator of corporate governance action.
18
Third, market entry and market exit of firms is likely to be important information for the
analysis of company performance. For example, a firm exiting its market might have adapted
insufficiently to the optimal level of employment and, as a consequence of low labor produc-
tivity, have been forced to shut down production. To adjust for potential selectivity bias, in-
formation on entry and exit should be incorporated in the empirical analysis. Unfortunately,
we only have a balanced panel, though with different spell lengths for the ten CEE countries.
Therefore, our sample is biased towards surviving firms and those which already existed at
the beginning of each country-specific sampling period. But since our sample starts in 1993,
19
it already includes a large number of firms founded at the outset of transition. At least, bias
resulting from too few new and fast growing firms should therefore be limited.
Finally, as far as unobserved firm heterogeneity influences restructuring, the results reported
in section 5.4 might be biased. As a check of robustness we also calculate random effect esti-
mators. However, none of our results is sensitive to this check.
20
5.3 Empirical Model
We model downsizing as a function of the corporate capital structure. More specifically, we
examine the non-positive growth rate of employment, given that a particular firm decreases
employment.
All results were calculated by maximum likelihood estimation of Tobit models.
21 Our basic
model for downsizing is specified as follows:
                                                
18 See Table A.2 in the appendix for the definition of this measure.
19 For Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania the sample starts in 1994.
20 Therefore, we do not report estimation results from the random effect models separately.
21 The Tobit model corrects for the estimation bias that would result from estimating our empirical model with
OLS. The reason is that our endogenous variable, the non-positive growth rate of employment is truncated at
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where i refers to the individual firm, t is the year for which non-positive labor growth is ob-
served, and m are control variables. The endogenous variable is the non-positive annual
growth rate of employment.
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We expect that firms with higher financial pressure, measured by the debt margin,
23 downsize
PRUH￿￿ 1<0.
24 Since we do not observe how weak the budget constraint for a given firm is, we
include a proxy for the likelihood that a firm is supported by direct subsidies or tax arrears.
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We expect that firms with weaker budget constraints can avoid layoffs and hence downsize
OHVV￿￿ 2>0. Likewise, availability of internal funds, both from reserves and current income, are
used as proxies for the firm’s ability to avert downsizing. We expect that firms with a large
SRRO￿RI￿LQWHUQDO￿IXQGV￿GRZQVL]H￿OHVV￿￿ 4!￿￿DQG￿ 5>0. To check whether indeed inefficient
firms downsize and not those that incidentally lack cash, we include labor productivity. We
H[SHFW￿WKDW￿ILUPV￿ZLWK￿ORZHU￿SURGXFWLYLW\￿VKRXOG￿GRZQVL]H￿VLJQLILFDQWO\￿PRUH￿￿ 3>0. Finally,
we include a range of control variables: firm size, firm age as well as the full set of country-
year and industry dummies.
To check the robustness of our results we run an extended model 1: We consider the different
sources of finance and add the degree of debt finance to the basic model.
26 We expect that
firms, which primarily finance themselves by debt, are also more likely to be pressed towards
downsizing. In addition, in firms that show an inflow of equity capital, probably corporate
governance action has taken place. If investors grant new funds, they probably will do so un-
der the condition that firms increase efficiency. Hence we would expect a positive effect on
downsizing, i.e. a negative coefficient.
Finally, to see whether the effect of financial pressure and soft budget-constraints change over
time, we run an extended model 2. We augment the extended model 1 by interacting the main
finance variables with a dummy, taking the value one for the years 1996-1998, and zero oth-
erwise. This allows us to check whether there is a difference in these variables’ effect on
downsizing, comparing the periods 1993-1995 and 1996-1998. As argued in section 4.2, we
                                                
22￿%HVLGHV￿WKH￿FRQVWDQW￿WHUP￿ ￿ZH￿LQFOXGH￿D￿VHW￿RI￿FRXQWU\￿\HDU￿GXPPLHV￿￿FRXQWU\￿LQWHUDFWHG￿ZLWK￿\HDU￿IRU￿QLQH
countries and five years, taking Poland in the year 1998 as our reference category), and a total of 44 industry
dummies (at the two-digit industry level using the European NACE code standard).
23 As a check of robustness we also use the borrowing ratio instead, a measure of interest pressure suggested by
NICKELL and NICOLITSAS (1999).
24 Note that the endogenous variable is negative. Thus, in this case the expected coefficient of financial pressure
is negative.
25 Dummy variable taking the value one if growth of sales is negative at least since two years and if the firm has
over 1000 employees, zero otherwise (see Table A.2 in the appendix).
26 Degree of debt finance: increase in debt divided by gross finance (see Table A.2 in the appendix).17
should expect stronger pressure towards downsizing in 1996-1998, when a higher borrowing
ratio and a higher debt margin reflect larger financial pressure from creditors. On the other
hand, as argued in section 4.3, the relative importance of debt finance as well as equity fi-
nance has been weaker during the years 1996-1998, hence financial pressure from creditors
and shareholders might also have weakened. Also, soft budget constraints have become more
likely during later transition as demonstrated in section 4.3.
5.4 Determinants of Downsizing
The following results are based on the analysis of firms, which have non-positive growth rates
of employment in a given year. For the basic model (Table 10, column 1) we find that the
level of debt does not have a significant impact on downsizing: A large debt burden does not
seem to press inefficient firms to downsize.
27 An important determinant of downsizing is,
however, productivity: We find that less productive firms downsize significantly more. Hence
downsizing generally affects the ‘right’ firms, and not those, which incidentally lack internal
funding but are run efficiently.
Table 10: Regression Results for Decreases in Employment (Tobit)
Endogenous Variable: Non-Positive Growth Rate of Employment
Basic Model Extended Model 1 Extended Model 2
Debt margin -0.001 (0.006) -0.013 (0.008) 0.003 (0.017)
Debt margin96-98 -0.001 (0.017)
Degree of debt finance -0.030** (0.007) -0.014** (0.004)
Degree of debt finance96-98 0.067 (0.039)
Debt margin * degree of
debt finance
0.038** (0.012)
Degree of equity finance -0.030** (0.006) -0.032** (0.006)
Soft budget constraints 0.025** (0.007) 0.025** (0.007) 0.020 (0.040)
Soft budget constraints96-98 0.005 (0.040)
Labor productivity 0.00007** (0.00001) 0.00007** (0.00001) 0.00007** (0.00001)
Retained earnings ratio 0.037 (0.007) 0.011 (0.008) 0.010 (0.008)
Return-on-sales 0.100** (0.012) 0.090** (0.015) 0.030 (0.037)
Growth opportunities 0.010** (0.002) 0.009** (0.002) 0.009** (0.002)
Age 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.00009 (0.0001) 0.00009 (0.0001)
Size -0.016** (0.001) -0.017** (0.002) -0.017** (0.002)
Number of observations 10649 9033 9033
Pseudo R
2 0.7941 0.9359 0.9341
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For definitions of all variables see Table A.2 in the appendix. All regres-
sions include two-digit industry dummies and a set of country-year dummies. * 5%-level of significance, **
1%-level of significance.
                                                
27 Note that the endogenous variable is negative. Therefore, a negative coefficient in the regression results indi-
cates a positive influence on downsizing.18
Soft budget constraints represent a significant barrier to downsizing. We find that firms,
which are likely to receive governmental support, downsize significantly less. This result is
robust to the inclusion of the structure of internal versus external funding (Table 10, column
2).
28 Hence, the results from the univariate analysis were misleading: There we have seen that
downsizing firms have, on average, lower debt margins (Table 9) what we (falsely) inter-
preted as lower financial pressure. Now, total indebtedness per se does not seem to have a
disciplinary function.
Firms with a larger potential for internal funding and better growth opportunities downsize
significantly less, as the positive coefficient on return-on-sales indicates. This suggests that
for a given level of labor productivity profitable firms, on average, face a smaller need to
downsize. On the other hand, availability of reserves, measured by the retained earnings ratio,
does not limit downsizing. This is probably due to the fact that reserves still play a minor role
in all CEE countries and are simply not large enough to withstand the pressure for
downsizing.
In extended model 1 we see that firms, which finance themselves largely by debt, downsize
significantly more. This indicates that in particular when firms are dependent on external
funding by debt, financial pressure can act as an effective disciplining device.
29 Interacting the
degree of debt finance with the level of debt, we see that financial pressure is stronger in firms
which simultaneously have low levels of debt and a high degree of debt finance. This suggests
that firms must downsize when they are dependent on debt financing and could not yet accu-
mulate much debt, for example because they were less creditworthy. Again, the results from
the univariate analysis were misleading because downsizing firms, on average, have a lower
degree of debt finance (Table 9), what we (falsely) interpreted as lower financial pressure.
Corporate governance action, indicated by an increase in the book value of share capital, is
associated with significant decreases in employment. This is evidence for pressure also from
shareholders: They only grant new funds if the firm fulfills a restructuring effort.
Checking for changes in financial pressure and soft budget constraints over time (Table 10,
column 3), we find that financial pressure - if measured by the degree of debt finance - leads
to downsizing throughout the years 1993-1998: The degree of debt finance has a significantly
                                                
28 We also included the current ratio as a measure of firms’ liquidity and hence as an indirect measure of finan-
cial pressure (Table 4), but we find that it has no significant impact on downsizing.
29 When we substitute the degree of debt finance with the borrowing ratio we find an analogous result.19
positive impact on downsizing as indicated by the negative coefficient. This effect is slightly,
but not significantly weaker during the years 1996-1998.
30 Soft budget constraints limit
downsizing throughout the sampling period and slightly stronger during later transition. Both
coefficients are not significantly different from zero; but the hypothesis that they are simulta-
neously zero is strongly rejected by an F-test. Comparing these results with our descriptive
results from section 4 we cannot confirm a significant decrease in financial pressure, as for
example indicated by a strong increase in the degree of debt finance and the probability of
soft budget constraints (Tables 6 and 7). But also the major increase in the debt margin (Ta-
bles 4 and 5), which could reflect larger pressure from creditors, has not translated into sig-
nificantly higher pressure towards downsizing.
Table 11: Country-Specific Impacts on Decreases in Employment (Tobit)
Endogenous Variable: Non-Positive Growth Rate of Employment
Debt Margin Degree of Debt Finance Soft Budget Constraints
Reference Country (Poland) -0.011 (0.037) -0.046 (0.027) -0.019 (0.042)
Bulgaria -0.019 (0.039) 0.009 (0.028) 0.056 (0.056)
Czech Republic 0.085* (0.038) 0.035 (0.027) -0.009 (0.044)
Estonia -0.024 (0.046) -0.034 (0.033) 0.026 (0.063)
Hungary 0.00003 (0.053) 0.035 (0.034) 0.037 (0.090)
Lithuania -0.124 (0.280) -0.058 (0.130) n.a.
Latvia -0.010 (0.058) -0.013 (0.045) n.a.
Romania -0.057 (0.038) 0.014 (0.027) 0.059 (0.042)
Slovenia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Number of observations 9033 9033 9033
Pseudo R
2 0.9690 0.9410 0.9410
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All three regressions were run with the same variables as used in the ex-
tended model 1 as shown in Table 10. The only difference is that country dummies were interacted with the
variable shown in the first row and included in the regression to determine country-specific effects. Only
these country-specific coefficients are shown in this table. * 5%-level of significance, ** 1%-level of signifi-
cance.
Turning to the country-specific effects, we find that for most countries the effects do not dif-
fer significantly (Table 11). For the debt margin, only in the Czech Republic firms with larger
levels of debt downsize significantly less. This is evidence that debt does not act as a disci-
plining device there. One reason might be that the Czech bankruptcy laws are inefficient and
do not allow lenders to put their debtors under pressure.
31 As it is Czech firms which are, on
average, the most indebted as measured by the debt margin (Tables 4 and 5), this questions if
the burden of debt per se has any disciplinary role at all.
                                                
30 Instead, when we use the borrowing ratio we find that financial pressure has weakened significantly.20
The degree of debt finance has a positive impact on downsizing, although significant only at
the ten percent level (Table 11, column 2). Thus in Poland, our reference country, debt inflow
works as a disciplining device. No country-specific differences emerge. But an F-test shows
that the remaining seven country-specific coefficients are different from zero at the one per-
cent level. The negative coefficients for the three Baltic states suggest that financial pressure
is the most likely in these countries.
Weak budget constraints do not seem to be country-specific either (Table 11, column 3). But
when we test whether the effects for Bulgaria and Romania are the same as in Poland, we
must strongly reject this hypothesis. Budget constraints appear to be weaker there.
6 Conclusions
The central question of this study is whether the corporate capital structure already works as a
disciplining device in CEE enterprises, or more specifically, whether creditors can fulfill their
corporate governance function by forcing inefficient firms to downsize. To answer this ques-
tion we first have analyzed the patterns of corporate finance in CEE enterprises, comparing
them with the patterns in Western enterprises. Based on firm-level data for the period 1993-
1998, the main results from our descriptive analysis can be summarized as follows:
•   Indebtedness of CEE enterprises has increased rapidly during transition, although the total
level of debt is still lower than in Western firms; the dominance of short-term debt has
weakened only slightly during transition; coverage of current liabilities has declined, indi-
cating shrinking liquidity of CEE firms.
•   Labor productivity is much lower than in Western enterprises, indicating low efficiency;
funding from current income reaches or exceeds Western levels, probably due to still less
intensive competition in CEE product markets; during transition, productivity as well as
reserves have increased rapidly, and growth of sales and current income have decreased.
•   CEE firms finance themselves predominantly internally, and external finance by debt is
much more important than external finance by equity; during transition, internal finance
has become much more important in all CEE countries with the exception of Poland; the
likelihood of soft budget constraints has increased, and is the largest in Romania and the
Czech Republic during 1996-1998.
                                                                                                                                                      
31 An F-test shows that, jointly, the country-specific coefficients are different from zero.21
•   Slovenia, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are the most advanced economies in
terms of efficient usage of resources; Estonia, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Repub-
lic show the highest levels of debt.
Taken together, these descriptive results suggest that there is room for corporate governance
exercised by creditors: CEE enterprises are already highly indebted after only ten years of
transition, and their liquidity is shrinking, possibly indicating hardening budget constraints. At
the same time, CEE enterprises finance themselves largely internally, even more so during
later transition, making corporate governance action from creditors, but also from sharehold-
ers more difficult.
Additionally, we find that a large fraction of CEE firms significantly reduce or increase their
labor force. A univariate analysis shows that downsizing firms, on average, have a lower debt
margin, a lower borrowing ratio and even a higher probability of soft budget constraints than
firms which do not downsize. Management in downsizing firms seems to face also less pres-
sure from outside suppliers of capital because a larger share of gross investment is financed
internally, compared with firms that do not downsize. But downsizing firms have also a much
lower potential for internal funding, as reflected by lower returns-on-equity, lower labor pro-
ductivity and a smaller cash flow position. Hence, from the univariate analysis there is no
clear evidence that firms downsize following financial pressure from creditors or outside in-
vestors.
In a second step, we examine the effect of financial pressure on downsizing under ceteris
paribus conditions using a regression analysis. We find that firms with a larger burden of debt
do not downsize significantly more, but that firms, which finance themselves largely by debt,
show significantly larger downsizing activity. This effect is stronger, the lower the total bur-
den of debt is. This suggests that financial intermediaries are already able to fulfill their
monitoring function by pressing CEE firms to downsize, but only when these firms are de-
pendent on bank finance. Likewise, firms which show larger inflows of capital from equity
issues show larger downsizing activity – an indicator of corporate governance action by
shareholders. Downsizing seems to hit the ‘right’ firms as inefficient firms reduce their labor
force significantly more extensive.
Interestingly, only in the Czech Republic firms with higher debt levels downsize significantly
less. As Czech firms have, on average, one of the highest debt levels, this casts doubt on the
usefulness of the total burden of debt as a measure of financial pressure from creditors. But it
could also be due to the fact that in particular Czech firms receive government-subsidized22
loans. Finally, firms which are likely to have soft budget constraints reduce employment sig-
nificantly less. There is evidence that this kind of governmental support limits restructuring
especially in Bulgaria and Romania.23
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Appendix
Table A.1: Observations by Country and Period
Country Number of Observations
Period 1: 1993-1995 Period 2: 1996-1998 Total
Bulgaria 4892 3532 8424
Czech Republic 4782 5140 9922
Estonia 673 710 1383
Hungary 1204 2538 3742
Lithuania 91 157 248
Latvia 276 609 885
Poland 3954 5077 9031
Romania 5940 6215 12155
Slovenia 1091 263 1354
Slovak Republic 585 789 1374
Total CEE Countries 23488 25030 48518
United Kingdom 0 23515 23515
Germany 0 36529 36529
Total Western Countries 0 60044 60044
Notes: Only observations with no missing values on the item “sales”.
Table A.2: Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
Debt margin total debt / total assets
Short-term ratio short-term debt / total debt
Borrowing ratio interest payments / (gross profit + interest payments +
depreciation)
Current ratio current assets / current (short-term) debt
Gross finance ￿ERRN￿YDOXH￿RI￿VKDUH￿FDSLWDO￿￿￿  debt + gross profits
before interest and taxes
Degree of equity finance ￿ERRN￿YDOXH￿RI￿VKDUH￿FDSLWDO￿￿￿JURVV￿ILQDQFH
Degree of debt finance  debt / gross finance
Degree of internal finance gross profits before interest and taxes / gross finance
Soft budget constraints dummy: 1 if growth of sales is negative at least since
two years and firm has over 1000 employees, 0 oth-
erwise
Retained earnings ratio reserves / assets
Cash flow profit after taxes and extraordinary items + extraordi-
nary expenses + taxes + interest payments + depre-
ciation
Labor productivity sales / number employees
Growth opportunities mean growth rate of sales over all past available years
Return-on-sales (ROS) profit from operations (before financial profit and
taxes) / sales
Firm size natural logarithm of sales
Firm age year less year of foundation